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ABSTRACT: We present empirical evidence from social psychological research which suggests that 
standard methods (“show & tell”) employed when teaching the heuristics and biases program in the 
context of critical thinking (CT) instruction are likelier to facilitate the discernment and correction of 
biases in others’ reasoning than to have a similar effect in the self-monitoring case. Exemplified by 
the social phenomenon of false polarization, we suggest that CT instruction may be improved by 
fostering student’s abilities at counterfactual meta-cognition, and present a corresponding teaching 
and learning activity.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
According to the heuristics and biases program in social psychology (e.g., Gigerenzer 
et al., 1999; Kahneman et al., 1982; Kahneman, 2011; Sahlin et al., 2010; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974), when acquiring and evaluating information in order to acquire, 
sustain, or change belief, humans regularly entertain search rules (aka heuristics) 
that are under-complex (biased) and regularly terminated before an optimal result 
is achieved (satisficing). It is natural to assume that making agents aware of such 
biases would also tend to de-bias them—i.e., minimize the effects of biases in their 
own reasoning and belief. However, experimental evidence suggests that merely 
teaching people that they are likely subject to biases is a rather ineffective means of 
de-biasing them. A “deeper” engagement with agents’ cognitive skills and practices 
appears to be required in order for de-biasing to function as a self-corrective 
contribution to better judgment and action.  
 The following motivates and describes a teaching and learning activity (TLA) 
which should improve learners’ ability to self-discern and self-correct their own 
biases. The purpose is to assist instructors of critical thinking courses in designing 
and deploying this TLA either in a dedicated course or as an instrument in “critical 
thinking across the curriculum.” The TLA is based on experimental studies carried 
out in social psychology, but it has (to the author’s knowledge) not been 
systematically tested in a class room setting, so far. In the terms of Fischhoff (2010), 
the TLA constitutes an item of prescriptive interventionism. 
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After briefly describing biases (Sect. 2), we present our test case, false 
polarization, as a social phenomenon that is sustained by biases and their ascription 
(3). Subsequently, we lay out a route along which the ability to self-discern biases 
may be improved (4). We then describe the TLA, both analytically and sequentially, 
formulate learning outcomes and assessment techniques (5), and close with a 
discussion (6) plus summary (7). 
 
2. BIASES 
 
Larrick (2008, p. 319f.) offers a useful distinction between three basic types of 
errors in human reasoning and decision making that are owed to biases: (i) 
psychophysically-based errors such as reference point effects, e.g., the overweighing 
of the most recently received information vis-à-vis all information received; (ii) 
association-based errors, e.g., deciding on the basis of so far available evidence 
rather than searching for more complete/representative evidence; and (iii) strategy-
based errors, e.g., the use of inferior strategies or decision rules, such as “a bird in 
the hand is worth two in the bush.” As he further points out, “many biases are 
multiply-determined” (ibid.) 
Biases, and the framing effects to which they can give rise (see below), are 
considered latent: subjects are normally unaware that a bias is “at work.” This being 
so may be found explained in terms of an evolutionary inheritance as the result of 
“coping” with natural and social environments in ways that deliver acceptable 
results in some or perhaps even most cases. It is therefore only half-joking to speak 
of “Simple heuristics that make us smart [enough to get by]” (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; 
Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009).  
With some simplification, what contemporary social psychologists have come 
to call “biases,” philosophers and scholars of law, amongst others, have long known 
as “fallacies.” The latter two fields share a tradition in Aristotelian scholarship, 
specifically the critiques of the Sophistic mode of audience persuasion—in response 
to which the identification and classification of fallacies arose as a scholarly topic 
(Conley, 1990). Amongst others, the 16th century Francis Bacon’s idolatry or the 
17th century John Locke’s naming of a range of fallacies fronted by ‘ad’ (e.g., ad 
hominem) have continued this tradition into the modern age. With Hamblin’s (1970) 
standard work, fallacies have come to be “bread and butter” in speech 
communication, rhetoric, and argumentation studies.  
In the discussion that is nowadays centered in the cognitive sciences, widely 
understood, terms such as “anchoring” are—for reasons one might speculate 
about—often treated as recent discoveries, although predecessor terms may almost 
always be identified, sometimes as far back as the 4th and 5th centuries BC. It 
transpires that biases and fallacies are intimately related. It is standard parlance to 
reference a bias—understood as the psychological, or internal, and non-directly 
observable or ascribed part—in order to explain why a fallacy—as the behavioral, 
or external, and directly observable part—came about. Generally speaking, the 
recent empirical study of human reasoning under controlled experimental 
conditions has delivered important quantified results. Such may well count as 
historical novelties, but the phenomena are certainly much older. 
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Although scholarly disagreement continues to persist with respect to the 
interpretation of various “classical” reasoning tasks—such as the “Linda problem” 
or Wason’s selection task (see, e.g., Charness et al., 2010; van Lambalgen, 2013)—, it 
is presently considered well-established that humans by and large overestimate the 
extent to which their beliefs are true, correct, warranted, or reliably acquired vis-à-
vis alternative beliefs or belief-forming methods (confirmation bias). In some cases, 
agents display behavior consistent with the assumption that they not only ignore, 
but do not even perceive counterevidence; in other cases, should counter-evidence 
register, this may occur for the sole-purpose of formulating rebuttals, the persuasive 
strength of which may, in turn, be estimated incorrectly. Although the empirical 
evidence may still count as “somewhat sketchy,”  
 
[a] few studies have looked at people’s perceptions of specific influences that 
compromise objectivity. Studies have shown people’s inclination to view those 
whose opinions differ from their own as influenced by self-interest (Reeder, Pryor, 
Wohl, & Griswell, 2005), personal affections (Frantz, 2006), political partisanship 
(Cohen, 2003), an inability to see things fairly (Ehrlinger, Gilovich, & Ross, 2005), 
and unwavering ideology (Robinson et al., 1995).  (Kennedy & Pronin, 2008, p. 
834) 
 
Further evidence includes experimental studies that, by and large, even see 
physicians report preferring a treatment with an 80% success-rate over a different 
treatment with a 20% failure-rate. This is interpreted as a “framing effect.” After all, 
despite otherwise identical content, the positively framed version of a message is 
demonstrably preferred over the negative version. If experimental results transfer, 
then similar effects hold both for everyday and professional judgment and action.  
 
3. FALSE POLARIZATION 
 
A standard teaching and learning activity (TLA), suitable, e.g., for an introductory 
level course in critical thinking, might familiarize learners with a selection of biases. 
This normally occurs by way of presenting written or transcribed examples of 
externalized reasoning episodes (aka arguments) exemplifying one or more biases. 
A typical assignment might consist in documenting additional examples from the 
media, or from personal interaction. Such TLAs require applying a classification 
schema in order to identify bias instances, much in the way that students might 
apply a botanical taxonomy to identify plants in their neighbor’s backyard. 
A shortcoming of TLAs that are designed in a similar “show & tell”-fashion, or 
so Fischhoff (1982) demonstrates, is the unilateral improvement of the average 
ability to discern biases ascribable to (the reasoning of) a third party. These TLAs 
may be expected to increase the frequency of (correct) third party bias ascriptions, 
yet fail in improving the ability to discern own biases. In the above metaphor, 
students thus fail to apply their knowledge to the plants in their own backyard. 
A social phenomenon sustained by such failure is known as false polarization 
(Keltner & Robinson, 1993, 1996; Monin & Norton, 2003; Robinson, Keltner, Ward, 
& Ross, 1995). The term refers to disputants’ tendency to overestimate the degree of 
their disagreement, i.e., “how far apart the parties are” (Figure 1). Importantly, one 
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may grant that disputants have good reasons to disagree in the first place (see 
Zenker, 2012, Sect. 5). The issue, then, is not that groups or individuals polarize, but 
that their perceived difference over some issue—when expressed as a comparative 
distance (ordinal level)—is greater than their de facto difference. See Sunstein 
(2002) for the “true” polarization phenomenon, where a group starts out with (a 
joint belief in) some position, P, on an issue, then discusses, and ends with a (joint) 
belief in a more extreme position, P*, or with a greater degree of (joint) belief in P. 
 
 
Figure 1: Overestimating the Distance of Disagreement (from Pronin, Puccio, & Ross, 
2002). The upper case illustrates an ordinal distance according to actual views. In 
the lower two cases, opponent groups (triangles; circles) overestimate their 
comparative distance. 
 
As Kennedy and Pronin (2008) suggest, an apparently greater disagreement 
invites the imputation of greater bias, and vice versa. They also suggest that bias 
ascription correlates with opponents’ mutual expectations that the disagreement 
will escalate, rather than be resolved through cooperation. Hence, “as viewpoints 
become more radically opposed in a discursive context, the prospects worsen for 
finding common ground from which either disputant may be engaged in productive 
discussion” (Kenyon, forthcoming). Such overestimation, then, adds a gap to the true 
distance between proponent and opponent position.  
Puccio & Ross (1998), and Pronin, Puccio, & Ross (2002) suggest on the basis 
of experimental evidence that a reliable way of improving the ability to self-discern 
own biases—and, thus, mitigate or avoid false polarization—consists in considering 
the strengths and weaknesses of positions and reasoning not endorsed personally 
(aka “seriously considering the other side”). Also see Larrick (2008, p. 323f.) 
 
Partisans in the express-own-position condition in these studies showed the 
expected false polarization effect, markedly overestimating the gap between the 
positions of the two sides. By contrast, participants in the express-other-position 
(and, in one study, those in a third condition in which they expressed both 
positions) hardly overestimated this gap at all. (Pronin, Puccio, & Ross 2002, p. 653) 
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Standardly, cognitive and social barriers are cited to explain the false polarization 
effect. As with other biases, humans appear to suffer from a “bias blind-spot,” in the 
sense of entertaining the belief that a bias is affecting others, but not themselves 
(ibid.). Consequently, knowing about a bias will not suffice to mitigate own biases. 
Possibly, there is a temptation to believe that introspection or will-power alone is 
efficient for de-biasing. However, as Frantz (2006) and Hirt and Markman (1995) 
submit, introspection and mental effort may, in some cases, even make a bias worse. 
Some authors further hold that a merely cognitive effort may, in particular cases, 
remain insufficient for de-biasing (Frantz & Janoff-Bulman, 2000). Perhaps an 
emotional component, or a quasi-religious experience, might be required.  
More specific to false polarization, under normal conditions there are social 
barriers which may, in the presence of opponents or in-group members, keep 
disputants from openly admitting that they are, or have been, prone to biases. After 
all, granting reasonable elements of an opponent’s position may appear disloyal, or 
hostile, to one’s in-group. In doing so, one may further provide the material for an 
opponent’s ex concessis attack—widely thought to be the most persuasive form of 
counter-argument. Finally, one may appear weak-minded to observers or audiences. 
We now lay out a way for these barriers to be potentially overcome in the 
context of class-room instruction. 
 
4. FOSTERING THE ABILITY TO SELF-DISCERN BIASES 
 
From learners, this teaching and learning activity (TLA) demands engaging in 
‘counterfactual meta-cognition’, i.e., engaging in reasoning episodes that one does 
not agree with personally. Required from instructors is an above average ability to 
(prepare teaching materials that) present a balance of reasoning and argumentation 
originating at both sides of an issue. Typical examples are found in social policy 
controversies (e.g., Zenker, 2010 on human embryonic stem cell research). A 
background in discourse analysis and informal logic may be found indispensable. 
The success of this TLA will also depend on personal qualities of the instructor, 
notably situational knowledge, trustworthiness, and neutrality (see Section 6). 
Generally, the following can be situated in the (age old) ‘Forum Movement’- 
tradition (Keith, 2007), and may claim support from research results obtained in 
social and cognitive educational psychology laid out, for instance, by Kuhn (1992). 
 
4.1 Analytical description 
 
The TLA (i) assesses the position a learner holds on some issue (by indicating 
distances, as in Figure 1, above), (ii) then assigns the learner to a group of similarly 
opinioned students who discuss arguments supporting an opposite or, at any rate, a 
different position, in order to (iii) better estimate the strengths and weaknesses of 
these positions (individually and through teacher feedback), before (iv) learners 
report that position, and (v) compare it to their initial distance estimate. 
On the basis of (v), the identification of biases in the initial assessment may 
be pursued. It then becomes a precondition that, prior to this TLA, students acquire 
some familiarity with the bias literature. In terms of decreasing the distance of 
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disagreement, however, learning does not seem to depend on such familiarity. 
 
4.2 Sequential description 
 
Stepwise, with structural-learning terms (McKeachie & Svinicki, 2006) bracketed 
(steps 1 and 8 require dedicated sessions): 
1. Standard presentation of the bias literature with examples and 
discussion. 
2. The group agrees on a topic that students potentially polarize over, 
such that subgroups for the most part either favor or disfavor a 
position (such as capital punishment, genetic modification, just war, 
nuclear energy, gun control, etc., or more mundane topics such as 
“The new university policy on …”). 
3. Group members call out reasons pro/con one or the other position 
(pre-structural). Reasons are noted (on the blackboard or via 
electronic means) under two columns: favor (pro) vs. disfavor (con) 
(uni-structural). 
4. The group provides an initial structure over these reasons by 
distinguishing reasons that are motivated by value-considerations 
from those motivated by the (non-)desirability of effects (deontic vs. 
consequential) (multi-structural). 
5. Members self-identify as endorsing one rather than another position, 
and are allocated to subgroups (of 5-7 participants, ideally). Those 
endorsing position X are assigned to a subgroup engaging with a 
position that entails: X is false. More than two subgroups can be 
formed, if the number of learners requires it. Members who have a 
neutral attitude to the issue at hand can be assigned observer-roles. 
They meet with a group, but do not interact argumentatively. Their 
function is to later provide a third party report on the group 
interaction. In particular, they should record which reasons were 
(not) discussed intensely.  
6. Subgroups discuss the reasons made available earlier and relate pro-
reasons with con-reasons, so as to create a structure in which a pro-
reason should “meet” with a dialectically adequate con-reason (e.g., 
one reason may provide a rebuttal or a critique of, or a rejoinder, or a 
follow-up claim to, another reason). Learners can both generate and 
check their pairings by entertaining questions such as “Why might a 
reasonable person believe the opposing view?” or “If I believed the 
opposing view, what would my best reasons be?” Subsequently, 
reasons are added, and may be strengthened/weakened through 
additional information (relational level). This can occur through input 
from the instructor, or from other learners. Subgroups then present 
the position they have engaged in to subgroup members. 
7. Subgroups return to the plenum, and present their order and 
structure over pro/con reasons, pointing out new information that 
was developed in the subgroup. The structures are compared and 
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discussed, to “pick the best of each,” i.e., arrive at a joint structure, or a 
similarity class thereof. (Argument diagramming software may prove 
helpful here.) This serves to observe which reasons have not met with 
an adequate con-reason, thus identifying the strongest reasons 
pro/con an issue, on the assumption that a given reason—provided 
other qualities such as internal consistency—may not be assigned a 
non-arbitrary defeater, including considerations of moral value 
(abstract level). 
8. In a dedicated session, at least one day after the previous, learners 
return to their initial assessment of the positions endorsed, and seek 
to re-assess if and why they initially considered reasons to be, in a 
relevant sense, stronger than they turned out to be. Naming biases 
becomes conditionally relevant here. After all, students may wish to 
provide to themselves some explanation why they had initially 
thought of some position as stronger or weaker. Citing own biases 
provides such an explanation. Based on this re-assessment, students 
should be able to identify which of a set of biases may account for 
their initial assessment. Hence, it is not so important to “get the name 
of a bias right,” but to enable students to comprehend that a bias may 
be at work in their own reasoning. 
 
5. LEARNING OUTCOMES CROSSED WITH ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES 
 
Assessment techniques (Table 1) are chosen such that (i) instructors can provide 
feedback on the initial (“preparatory”) and the final learning outcome; (ii) peers 
(subgroups) provide intermediate feedback, followed by (iii) group feedback.  
Discerning one’s own biases is an individual task, and so is collecting evidence of 
biases in natural language discourse. The minute papers serve to “get the facts 
straight.”  The more important assessments involve feedback on the application and 
transfer of knowledge, and discussion, to discourage surface-learning. 
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Assessment Technique 
 
 
Learning Outcome 
 
Successful Learners will be able to …  
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1. Report standard explanations why human 
reasoning is prone to biases. 
     
2. Describe the character of such biases in your own 
terms, and give examples. 
     
3. Identify biases on the basis of third party 
argumentative language, written or spoken. 
     
4. Express at least one standpoint on the following 
question issue: …? 
     
5. Apply your new knowledge to your own 
standpoints, by identifying one on which you may 
(have) entertain(ed) a biased view. (Name the bias.) 
     
Table 1: Assessment Techniques crossed with learning outcomes 
 
6. DISCUSSION 
 
In simple terms, the immediate purpose of the TLA is for learners to become more 
familiar with the strengths and weaknesses of their own positions, by becoming 
aware of positions they do not endorse personally. This is here called “engaging 
with the other side.” Through such engaging, one’s own biases may be better 
discerned than without such engaging, or so is the central assumption.  
The more general goal is to provide students with two cognitive benefits: (i) 
an awareness of the insidiousness of bias, according to which an initial sense of 
being unbiased should not preclude taking steps to de-bias anyhow; and (ii) a model 
for de-biasing that implicates charitable engagement with interlocutors’ views, 
rather than a mere self-check of one’s presumably good intentions. 
Besides character traits (e.g., intellectual courage), learning success depends 
on the quality of the argumentative material made accessible to learners (see 
below), and on how success is measured. As for measurement, it is here considered 
relatively unimportant that learners acquire the entrenched term for some biases, 
as these are used in the literature. In principle, learners may very well pick their 
own names, then compare those—through assistance from the instructor—to the 
technical term(s). Hence, success should not be measured by the student’s ability to 
correctly repeat terms, but by the ability to identify the “character” of a bias. At the 
same time, should a significant number of students not be able to self-discern a 
single bias in their own initial assessment of a position they endorse personally, the 
TLA should likely count as a failure.  
Secondly, the cognitive availability of plausible counterfactuals is a partial 
function of one’s actual commitments. So, learners may not readily succeed at 
FRANK ZENKER 
9 
contemplating reasons which support a view incompatible with their own: 
“[F]inding such reasons is likely to be difficult, and the judge [or agent] may infer 
from this difficulty that there are not many—or else they would not be so difficult to 
generate” (Sanna et al., 2002). Instructors will need to prepare for such difficulty, 
i.e., prepare to deliver reasons unknown to learners, in ways that will be found 
accessible.  
After all, it cannot reasonably count as a learner’s “fault,” should instructors 
withhold on relevant considerations. To give but one example, to reasonably engage 
with the nuclear energy-issue, a long term perspective (of several generations) and 
the rate of radioactivity decay better be mentioned. This recommends using 
material that is already studied to some extent, for instance in controversy studies 
(van Eemeren et al., 2009)—a strand of discourse analysis—or in better quality 
critical thinking textbooks (e.g., Kenyon, 2008).  
As indicated above, visual representations of debates (“controversy maps”) 
may be provided. Some—e.g., scientific controversies such as the corpuscle vs. wave 
interpretation of light—will not be suitable in all conditions. Generally, a trade-off 
may be unavoidable between “keeping facts straight” and keeping learners engaged 
in issues they take positions on. See Newell, Beach, Smith, & Van Der Heide (2011). 
 
7. SUMMARY 
 
This TLA relies on empirical evidence that standard ways of teaching the heuristics 
and biases literature are unlikely to improve learners’ abilities at discerning their 
own biases, ceteris paribus. We described a TLA geared towards such improvement. 
Its success depends on learners engaging cognitively with the reasoning of another 
party in an instructor-guided manner. The TLA can potentially help groups that 
disagree on some contested issue avoid the effects of false polarization.  
It is less important that learners acquire knowledge of a bias’ technical term, 
though the TLA can be adapted to this outcome. Having stressed the role of a 
qualified teacher, learning outcomes and assessment techniques were proposed, 
and sources for teaching material pointed out.  
The instructor’s most important tasks consist in the development/adaptation 
of this material, and the “fine tuning” of the TLA to students’ needs and 
prerequisites over a total of three deployments. This includes determining the 
appropriate time the TLA shall take, as well as the preceding and subsequent TLAs, 
e.g., a lecture and a reflection-unit. 
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